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 We study investigates the issue of self-selection of stakeholders into participation and 
collaboration in policy-relevant experiments. 
 We document and test the implications of self-selection in the context of randomised policy 
experiment we conducted in primary schools in the UK. 
 The experiment tests the effects of an intervention aimed at encouraging children to make 
more healthy choices at lunch. 
 There is mild evidence of selection on key observables such as obesity levels and socio-
economic characteristics.  
 There is selection along indicators of involvement in healthy lifestyle programmes at the 
school level, but the magnitude is small. 
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Abstract
This study investigates the issue of self-selection of stakeholders into participation
and collaboration in policy-relevant experiments. We document and test the impli-
cations of self-selection in the context of randomised policy experiment we conducted
in primary schools in the UK. The main questions we ask are (1) is there evidence
of selection on key observable characteristics likely to matter for the outcome of
interest and (2) to what extent does selection matter. The experimental work con-
sists in testing the effects of an intervention aimed at encouraging children to make
more healthy choices at lunch. We recruited schools through local authorities and
randomised schools across two incentive treatments and a control group. We doc-
ument the selection taking place both at the level of local authorities and at the
school level. Overall we find mild evidence of selection on key observables such
as obesity levels and socio-economic characteristics. We find evidence of selection
along indicators of involvement in healthy lifestyle programmes at the school level,
but the magnitude is small.
JEL Classification: C93, I18, J13
Keywords: Selection, Field Experiments, Randomised controlled trials, External Va-
lidity
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1. Introduction
Field experiments in economics and the social sciences have become increasing popular
(Holt, 2005). The main driving factors behind this increasing prevalence are, on the one
hand, the quest for identification of causal mechanisms – which is easier to achieve when
researchers are directly involved in manipulating the economic environment of interest –
and, on the other hand, a quest to remain close to reality as opposed to studying subjects
in an isolated laboratory context. There is now a stronghold of researchers advocating
the case for randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in social policy (Burtless, 1995, Duflo
and Kremer, 2005).
This study is interested specifically in a fundamental methodological issue associated
with field experimental research: the selection of field collaborators into the experiment.
Conducting field experiments usually requires finding collaborators such as employers,
policymakers, schools, etc. who are prepared to collaborate with researchers and provide
the necessary support for data collection. As List (2011) puts it, the support of a key
person prepared to stand behind the research project is often critical: “Have a champion
within the organization – the higher up the better. Making the experiment a “we” project
instead of an “us versus them” pursuit as early as possible is critical.” Surprisingly
perhaps, field experimental papers devote very little attention to the issue of “selection
into the experiment”. As an illustration, we provide in Table A1 a brief overview of the
information provided in field experimental studies published in the top 5 journals and in
the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. We focus on the fields of policy
evaluation, personnel economics and development economics, which have all experienced
a significant increase in the popularity of field experimental research.1 In most cases we
know little or nothing about how the collaborators were selected and approached, and the
experimental sample is not compared to the broader population of interest. One notable
exception is a recent paper by Fryer (2011).
Researchers are well aware of the limitations that result from restricting experiments
to subjects who have opted in. The main limitation is a possible selection bias and a lack
of external validity. Of course, some form of selection is inevitable. An experiment will,
for example, take place within a given geographical area and at a particular point in time.
This initial selection is often for practical reasons. Researchers located in California will
find it more practical to conduct a field experiment in California than across the entire
United States or across several countries. It is probably even desirable that the experiment
can be conducted with sufficient oversight by the researchers. It does nevertheless raise
1We searched these journals systematically for the keywords ‘field experiment’.
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issues of generalizability, insofar as it restricts the sample to a population with certain
characteristics (e.g. people living in California at a particular time).
How important is selection in field experimental research? Harrison and List (2004)
acknowledge in their review paper that we know very little about the implications of self-
selection for field experimental research. Seven years later Ludwig et al. (2011) point out
that this is still an open question that has not been answered. At the moment, researchers
tend to be very conservative and modest in their claims regarding the external validity of
their results. We believe that a proper documentation of the selection process would help
us drawing more general lessons from field randomised controlled experiments.
We study self-selection in participation in an experiment conducted in a highly policy
relevant domain: children’s diet. The goal of the experiment is to test the effectiveness of
various incentive schemes to encourage children to eat fruit and vegetables at lunch2. To
conduct this experiment, we sought the collaboration of primary schools in England. We
recruited them through local education authorities (LEAs), which play an overarching
and coordinating role. Rather than picking a set of local authorities in an arbitrary
manner, we approached all local authorities in the country at the same time and in the
same manner (via e-mail) and asked whether they would be interested in collaborating
with us. If they responded positively, we asked them to bring us in contact with at
least five local schools representative of the local authority. Providing names of schools
requires some effort, so the type of selection we study is not only based on initial interest
(that is low cost to indicate) but also on actual commitment in the experiment. The
randomisation eventually takes place at the school level and within local authorities, so
local authorities should expect some schools to be treated and some schools to be part
of a control group. The schools are the ones that are ultimately directly involved in
the experiment and data collection. We contacted the schools suggested by the local
authorities, briefed them about the project and they then decided whether to participate
or not. Thus, we have potential selection operating at different levels: self-selection of
local authorities, selection of “representative” schools by local authorities and selection
of schools into the experiment.
We document how selection operates at these different levels along observable char-
acteristics of the population under consideration – characteristics that we would expect
could matter in the decision to participate, such as obesity rates and socio-economic
indicators. We consider a wide range of variables that could a priori be relevant and
see whether they are correlated with selection or not. Then we investigate whether the
2We refer to Belot et al. (2015) for the full analysis of the experiment.
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treatment effects are biased by observables correlated with selection, we do not find any
evidence that this is the case.
It is clear that we cannot control for some key variables (such as personality char-
acteristics of the people involved) that may introduce a selection bias in the RCT as
well. Moreover, it is clear that if selection was only driven by observables, it would be
straightforward to correct for it. The point here is to get a sense of how much selection
takes place along characteristics that could a priori be relevant and are observable, which
should in principle give a sense of the importance of the full selection problem.
Our findings can be summarised as follows. First, we find that out of the 150 local
authorities we initially contacted, only 12 eventually participated in the actual experiment.
We find that local authorities who express initial interest tend to be larger and richer,
and have less favourable characteristics in terms of the outcome of interest (e.g. lower
rates of fruit and vegetable consumption), but the selection is mild. We find no evidence
that selection operates according to pre-trends. We also find little evidence of selection
at the school level, except for one dimension, which is that the schools suggested by the
local authorities to conduct the experiment are more likely to be involved in programmes
promoting healthy lifestyles (as evaluated by an independent official body). Second, we
do not find any significant correlations between the treatment effects of the experiment
and the variables which, albeit to a mild degree, are correlated with selection into the
experiment.
Of course, the selection we document here is also ”case-specific”. We cannot claim
that the selection we document informs us about the magnitude and type of selection
taking place in other policy-relevant field experiments. But in the domain of policy-
relevant field experiments, this is an example of an intervention that targets a“hot” topic
on the policy agenda (children’s obesity) and the experimental intervention we propose is
typical in the sense that we propose to compensate the partners for the costs involved with
conducting the intervention and collecting the data. Even in that case we find that only
few potential partners eventually participate in the experiment. We believe this is typical
of many policy-relevant field experiments. If only a selected few eventually participate in
the study, we owe to pay more attention to how this selection affects our results.
We propose that the documentation exercise we perform here should be a minimum
standard for field experimental research in social sciences. It seems obvious that collecting
information on key variables at the early stages of an experiment can provide useful
insights into the possible magnitude of selection and is helpful to see how the results can
be generalized to the population at large, which is the overriding aim of pilot studies and
4
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policy-relevant experiments.
The remain of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related work.
Section 3 presents a simple model of the problem we are examining. Section 4 describes
the experimental design and the context of our study. In Section 5, we look at the
determinants of selection at the local authority and school levels. In Section 6 we examine
how the treatment effects from the experiment varying according to the determinants of
selection. We conclude in Section 7.
2. Related work
There is surprisingly little systematic work studying selection into field experiments. The
work most related to ours is the work on selection issues arising in policy evaluation studies
(Heckman and Vytlacil (2006)). This work derives theoretical implications regarding the
sign of the selection bias one should expect in these interventions. The general prediction
is that one should expect a positive selection bias: those who self-select in the intervention
are likely to be those who expect to benefit most from the intervention.
Malani (2008) develops a model of self-selection into medical randomised controlled
trials where participants self-select into the experiment based on a prior belief about
the effectiveness of the treatment. He assumes that patients have a choice between an
old treatment and participating in a randomised controlled trial (RCT) involving a new
treatment. As the probability of being assigned to the treatment group in the RCT
increases, less optimistic patients, those with a lower expected treatment effect, are willing
to participate in the RCT. If the probability is lower than 1 (which will always be the
case by definition in a RCT), only the most optimistic will be willing to experiment and
we will obtain a positive selection bias. The main difference with our model is that people
cannot access the new treatment out of the RCT. While this may be the case in medical
trials, it is usually not the case for experiments conducted in the social sciences. This is
why those who are optimistic may opt out and prefer to implement the intervention (or
a similar intervention) themselves.
In a related paper (Belot and James, 2014), we extend Malani’s model to the context
of randomised social and policy experiments. A key difference is that in a social or policy
experiment, the decision to participate in a randomized controlled trial does not only
entail a choice between participating or not doing anything. A third alternative could
be to conduct a similar intervention without taking part and without running the risk
of being in the control group. This alternative is likely to be attractive for the most
optimistic - those who believe the intervention may be effective. They may prefer to
5
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opt out from the experiment because there is a chance they will end up in the control
group and not receive the benefits from the intervention. In our context, the idea of using
incentives in a health-related context is not new. In fact there is a growing market for
stickers and other rewards to encourage children to eat healthily. Thus, it is plausible
that schools would have wanted to implement an incentive scheme independently of being
approached by us. But of course if they participate and end up in the control group, we
will explicitly ask them not to implement any incentive scheme over the course of the
study. This example is, we believe, quite representative for many randomised controlled
experiments. Thus, two types of selection (positive and negative) could take place at the
same time. On the one hand, we have a group of ”optimists” (who expect the treatment
to be successful) who could opt out and introduce a negative selection bias. On the other
hand, we have a group of ”pessimists” (who do not expect the treatment to be successful),
who could opt out as well if they are not fully compensated for the experimentation and
implementation costs. Their decision not to participate will introduce a positive selection
bias. Because both types of selection could take place at the same time, it is not possible
to sign the direction of the selection bias.
Allcott (2015) examines the issue of site selection bias and external validity. He uses
the Opower energy conservation programme which provided Home Energy Reports com-
paring energy use with their neighbours and well as providing tips on conversing energy.
He uses the first 10 replications of the programme which were spread across the country
covering over half a million households to predict the first-year effect in the forthcoming
101 sites. Using the microdata from these 10 initial sites over predicts the mean average
treatment effect for the remaining sites with the early sites being positively selected.
He also discusses various mechanisms of partner selection bias in randomized con-
trolled trials (RCTs) – both positive and negative. There could be a positive bias because
implementing randomized trials requires managerial ability and operational efficacy and
partners who run the most effective programmes may also be the best equipped to eval-
uate these programme. This form of positive partner selection bias has been called “gold
plating” (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2007). Another form of positive partner se-
lection bias results from the fact that those running effective programmes are more keen
to show they work than those who fear they are running ineffective ones, and prefer to
remain “ignorant” (Pritchett 2002). Negative partner selection bias could arise if those
who are running the most effective treatments have already treated the parts of their
population that have the largest treatment effects (”diminishing returns bias”).
More generally, a few recent studies study the issue of selection in various types of
6
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experimental research. Gautier and Van Der Klaauw (2012) examine selection of indi-
vidual participants in a field experiment setting. They examine the effect of selection in
a gift exchange game by exploiting a promotion in all hotels of a chain in Belgium and
the Netherlands that allowed customers to pay what they wished for a one-night stay.
They compare the behaviour of two groups of participants, an involuntary group who had
booked before the announcement of the promotion and were not aware of it at the time of
booking with a group who booked after the promotion was announced - a voluntary group.
The self-selected voluntary group paid less and did not respond to an exogenous change
in the posted price unlike the involuntary group. These results suggest that experiments
aiming at testing for pro-social behaviour are underestimating its presence in particular
where participants can self-select into the experiment. Although this does not involve
partner selection it shows in a unique and natural setting the role that self-selection can
play in leading to biased results in field (and lab) experiments. Frijters et al. (2015)
compare participants to an artefactual field experiment in urban China with the survey
population of migrants from which they were recruited. They find that the experimen-
tal participants differ significantly in their education, in the extent to which they lend
money to friends and the amount of hours worked. Cleave et al. (2013) study selection
into lab experiments by comparing the behaviour of students in a classroom experiment
to students participating to a ”standard” laboratory experiment. Both samples play a
trust game and a lottery choice task. They do not significant differences across these two
samples. However, they do find that people who sent less in a trust game were more
likely to participate in a laboratory experiment. Similarly, Slonim et al. (2013) finds
lab participants have lower income, work fewer hours, and volunteer more often. Overall
they find that people who come to the lab display behaviours that are correlated with
interest in experiments. To summarise, there are few studies documenting the issue of
self selection in randomised controlled experiments in social sciences and, in theory, the
sign of the selection bias could go either way.
3. Model and Empirical Strategy
3.1 The issue of external validity
We first discuss the standard assumptions required for external validity, following Hotz,
Imbens, and Mortimer (2005) and Allcott (2015). Assuming a population of N units,
with i indicating an individual unit (such as a school). Ti ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy variable
indicating whether the unit is treated (Ti = 1) or not (Ti = 0). Each individual unit
7
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has two potential outcomes, Yi(1) if treated and Yi(0) if not treated. Xi is a vector of
observable pre-treatment covariates, such as school test scores, prevalence of obesity, etc.
We will come back to these possible determinants later on in the section. The treatment
effect is defined as τi = Yi(1) − Yi(0).The heterogeneity in treatment effects could be
driven by factors such as the characteristics of the pupils, the motivation of the school
staff or the experience with similar interventions.
Suppose Di is a dummy variable indicating whether the unit participates to the ran-
domized controlled trial (Di = 1) or not (Di = 0). We are interested in the average
treatment effect (ATE). The ATE can be consistently estimated under the following as-
sumptions:
(1) Unconfoundedness. Ti ⊥ (Yi(1), Yi(0))|Xi. That is, the treatment must have been
assigned at random, conditionally on the vector of observable pre-treatment characteris-
tics.
(2) Overlap. 0 < Pr(Ti = 1|Xi = x) < 1. Thus, no covariate value, or combination of
covariate values, perfectly predicts getting the treatment.
(3) External unconfoundedness of participation. Di ⊥ (Yi(1), Yi(0))|Xi.That is, partic-
ipation in the experiment must have also been randomised, conditionally on pre-treatment
variables Xi.
(4) External Overlap. 0 < Pr(Di = 1|Xi = x) < 1. This states that no covariate value
or combinaion of covariate values perfectly predicts participation in the experiment.
Allcott (2015) discusses an additional assumption relevant to a situation where many
units participate in the RCT and researchers wish to extrapolate from these many units
to a large set of target units.
(5) No unit selection bias over a large number of units. E(τi(X)|Di = 1) = E(τi(X)|Di =
0). This assumption is useful because it allows heterogeneity in τi across units as long
as they average out between participating and non-participating units. He is able to test
this assumption directly.
3.2 A simple model of self-selection
We will now propose a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the type of selection that
may take place in the context of this experiment. The goal of the model is to highlight a
mechanism for self-selection that has not received much attention so far in the literature.
Specifically, we will show that positive and negative selection can arise at the same time.
8
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We refer to Belot and James (2014) for a more general presentation of the model. Here
we present how the same model applies to this particular setting.
We assume schools decide whether to participate or not to RCT. Schools do not
observe τi ex ante, but we assume they have a prior belief about the effectiveness of the
treatment, which we denote by τ ∗i . We assume that these beliefs are on average unbiased,
i.e. E(τ ∗i ) = τi. Variance in beliefs (for a given τi) could be driven by chance, but also
by other factors (most likely unobservable to the econometrician) such as over- or under-
confidence of the decision-maker or trust in the researchers who propose the experiment.
In the context of our experiment, conducting the intervention and participating to the
experiment entail costs, even for the control group. First, there are costs that are incurred
by all units participating, whether there are in the treatment or control groups. These
costs are associated with meetings with researchers, data collection, logistic organisation,
etc, which would not be incurred if they did not participate. We denote this cost cE.
Second, there is the cost of conducting the intervention, which is associated with the
implementation of the intervention itself and is only incurred by the treatment group. We
denote this cost cI . We assume that if units would incur cI as well if they would carry out
the intervention on their own.
We offered a compensation both to conduct the intervention (i.e. we paid for all
the materials involved) and for data collection (we paid for monitoring and for postage).
However, it is possible that schools were not fully compensated for their time and efforts.
We denote these subsidies sE (subsidi s to experimental costs) and sI (subsidies to the
intervention).
Schools are assigned to the treatment group with probably pi (in our case, it was 2/3)
and to the control group with probability (1− pi). The treatment group will implement
the intervention, while the control group is told not to implement any competing or
similar intervention. On the other hand, the non participants could of course implement
alternative interventions (similar or not to the experimental intervention). We assume
that schools know pi (this was the case in our setting).3
Thus, for participants the expected benefit from participating is equal to pi (τ ∗i + sI −
cI) + sE − cE. For non participants, the payoff is equal to max(τ ∗i − cI , 0).
The most interesting case is one where the best (i.e. most cost effective) available
intervention outside the experiment is the experimental intervention itself (or an inter-
3Note that if it was not known to decision makers, we would not expect changes in the results as long
as beliefs are unbiased. In the absence of information, decision markers are, for example, likely to assume
that pii = 0.5, in which case their beliefs could be systematically biased and biases in beliefs could affect
the decision to participate as well.
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vention that is similar to it in the sense that there is a positive correlation in treatment
effects). In that case, the two conditions for participating to the experiment are as follows:
pi(τ ∗i + sI − cI) + sE − cE > τ ∗i − cI
⇐⇒
τ ∗i <
sE + pisI − cE
(1− pi) − cI (1)
Condition (1) means that participating must be more profitable in expectations than
conducting the intervention outside the experiment. It shows that the most optimistic
opt out because they prefer to conduct the intervention outside the experiment. This type
of selection decreases with pi, the probability of being assigned to the treatment group
and with the subsidies (sE and sI), but increases with the costs of participating to the
experiment (cE) and of conducting the intervention (cI). The novelty here is to show that
negative selection can take place.
At the same time, the more ”standard” positive selection, commonly discussed in
policy evaluation studies (Heckman and Vytlacil (2006)) could take place as well. Partners
who have pessimistic beliefs (such that τ ∗i < cI), will opt in only if
pi(τ ∗i + sI − cI) + sE − cE > 0
⇐⇒
τ ∗i > cE − sE + pi(cI − sI) (2)
Condition (2) is more likely to be satistied if the subsidies are high (sE and sI) and
if the costs of participating to the experiment (cE) and the costs of conducting the inter-
vention (cI) are low.
Note that in our setting, we contacted local authorities that represent schools. Thus,
we should in fact talk about self selection by local authorities. The problem is isomorphic
to this one insofar as we assume that local authorities represent the average school. That
is, they take into account that a proportion pi of their schools will be assigned to the
treatment group and the remaining will be assigned to the control group.
Summarising, the model predicts that both negative and positive selection can take
place at the same time and that many variables that are usually thought of increasing
positive selection could actually lead to negative selection as well. Specifically, higher
10
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costs will lead to more positive and more negative selection.
Note that the model only allows for heterogeneity in the effectiveness of treatment.
It would be straightforward to extend it though to allow for heterogeneity in costs. The
surprising result here is that, again, higher costs increase both types of selection (positive
and negative) at the same time: If the costs are relatively high (holding the subsidies
constant), the benefit of participating to the experiment, in comparison to conducting
the intervention outside the experiment, decreases. But higher costs will also discourage
units to conduct the intervention at all.
Extensions. The model could be extended further to take account of a richer ob-
jective function for the potential experimental units. As it is, we effectively assume that
units care about the effectiveness of the intervention and do not differ in the way they
care about it. In practice and in our context in particular, we could expect that some
schools may care more about the outcome (i.e. getting children to eat more fruit and
vegetables) than others. Schools could also be more or less risk averse. That is, we could
have a utility function ui(τ
∗
i ) that captures the degree to which they care and their risk
aversion. The utility function could include altruism and risk aversion parameters. The
implications of this extension are also relatively simple: Any parameter that increases the
utility of the school for a given τ ∗i could lead to both positive and negative selection. For
example, principals who care a lot about the outcome may be more likely to opt out if
they are optimistic about the success of the intervention because conducting it outside
the experiment increases the chances of benefitting from it. On the other hand, if they
are relatively pessimistic about the effectiveness (and would therefore not conduct the in-
tervention on their own), the more they care about the outcome, the more likely they are
to opt out of the experiment. To our knowledge, such predictions are novel and highlight
that the type of selection taking place is not straightforward to predict. In contrast to
predictions based on models in the line of Heckman and Vytlacil (2006), participating
to the experiment does not necessarily draw the most motivated or altruistic partners.
And the main reason for that is that participating to the experiment entails an important
opportunity cost (having a chance of being in the control group), which has received little
attention so far.
Ultimately, one can only rely on careful empirical documentation of the selection taking
place to conjecture on which type of selection (positive or negative) may be dominating.
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3.3 Empirical strategy
As discussed above, the main determinants of selection included in the model are beliefs
about the effectiveness of the treatment, probabilities of being assigned to treatment
and control groups, costs of carrying out the intervention and of participating to the
experiment and the subsidies we will provide. Of course, the question is how do we know
whether there is positive or negative selection? By definition, we do not observe the
treatment effects for individuals who chose not to participate in the experiment. One
strategy is to exploit the information on observables at the time of selection and pose
assumptions regarding the relationship between observables and the variables determining
selection.
In the context of our study, we think of three main categories of (observable) factors
that could affect the marginal benefit from intervening and the costs associated with it
and with the experiment:
• Characteristics of the population targeted, such as the pre-intervention levels of
fruit and vegetable consumption. Suppose the outcome is a normal good with
decreasing marginal utility, then all else equal we would expect those with lower
levels of fruit and vegetable consumption to have higher τi. We have information
on consumption of fruit and vegetables pre-intervention, as well as levels of obesity
across local authorities. We also include a set of variables measuring average pupil
performance (standardised test scores), which are likely to be correlated with health-
related behaviours.
• The degree to which individuals are able to implement the intervention, which will
vary the costs of implementing the intervention. Here we think of organisatory and
planning skills that may be required to implement the intervention. If the potential
partners are larger in size and have access to more resources, they may be more
effective in implementing the intervention and in collaborating with the researchers.
We have information on size of local authorities and schools, as well as indicators of
income per capita at the local authority level and percentage of children receiving
free school meals. We would expect richer and larger authorities to have more
capacity (i.e. we conjecture there are increasing returns to scale) and may therefore
have a higher τi.
• The degree to which individuals care about the outcome of interest. We have infor-
mation on the degree to which schools promote healthy lifestyles. Also, one would
12
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expect that areas with higher obesity rates may be more concerned with implement-
ing policies aimed at encouraging healthier lifestyles.
We now turn to the description of the context and experimental design.
4. Context and Experimental Design
4.1 Policy Context
Obesity and diet are high on the policy agenda. The broad question of our study (which we
used to approach the local public authorities), is whether providing short-term incentives
can successfully encourage children to make healthier nutritional choices and develop
healthier habits. We contacted all 150 local authorities in the United Kingdom on Friday
2 July 2010 and Monday 5 July 2010 (we randomly selected half of the sample to be sent
on each day). The e-mail (see appendix D) described who we are and the aim of the
project. We specifically indicated that we were interested i comparing the effectiveness
of incentive schemes to increase the consumption of fruit and vegetables at lunch in
schools and that the interventions were designed to target children who have been found
to respond little to health interventions, such as children from poorer socio-economic
backgrounds and boys. These specific observables (consumption of fruit and vegetables,
children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds) vary across local authorities and we
are able to document precisely how selection takes place based on the observables we
mentioned in the letter.
The timing of this initial contact coincided with the First National Child Obesity
Week4 taking place in the UK, from July 5th until July 10th. School meals and children’s
diet were also widely discussed in the media. On 30 June 2010, the then Secretary of
Health Andrew Lansley criticized the Jamie Oliver School Food revolution, referring to
the campaign led by the British chef Jamie Oliver aimed at improving parental cooking
skills across the country (the criticism was targeted at the patronizing approach of the
campaign). The public criticism triggered a strong reaction in the media and the public.
Lansley apologised to Oliver later in October 2010. At the same time, the climate regard-
ing public funding was relatively grim. Large public funding cuts were expected across
the whole country.
4http://www.mendcentral.org/ncow
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4.2 Experimental Design
The experiment is fully documented in Belot, James and Nolen (2015). We will only
briefly describe the key elements of the experiment here. The goal of the experiment is to
study the effects of providing incentives on choosing and eating healthy items using two
different interventions: an individual scheme and competition scheme. In both schemes,
pupils were given a sticker for choosing or bringing in a healthy item at lunch. Then,
at the end of the week (Friday afternoon), each student had the opportunity to win a
larger prize. In the individual scheme, pupils were eligible for an additional reward if they
collected four stickers or more during the week. In the competition scheme, students were
assigned to random groups of four, and the pupil with the most stickers in each group
won an additional reward.
Our initial e-mail mentioned that we intended to test the effectiveness of incentive
schemes, without being specific. We also mentioned being particularly interested in study-
ing how boys would respond in comparison to girls, and how pupils from disadvantaged
backgrounds would respond in comparison to pupils from richer backgrounds. These spe-
cific interests came as a follow-up from a previous study we conducted in the UK (Belot
and James, 2011).
We now turn to the documentation of the selection in the context of our study.
5. Determinants of Selection
5.1 Selection at the level of local authorities
We first study the determinants of selection at the local authority level. Figure 1 presents
the decision process showing the different types of selection. We differentiate between
four different stages of selection. First, the local authorities responded to our e-mail or
not. Second, their response may have been positive (“positive initial interest”). Third, we
examine whether the local authority collaborated with us. We asked each local authority
to provide the names of 5 schools that could take part in the experiment; and asked for
these schools to be as representative as possible of the schools in the local area, in terms of
socio-demographics. The LEAs did not all respond to this request in the same way. Some
did contact schools before providing names; others recommended to advertise in all schools
of their area (and helped us doing that) and others provided a list without contacting
them first. We classify all these responses as collaboration since they did take action to
address our request. The final determinant of selection is participation. We define a local
authority as participating as if they have schools taking part in the intervention. Out of
14
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the 150 local authorities contacted, 63 responded within a month. 33 indicated a positive
interest in collaborating and 18 asked for a meeting. 22 of them have effectively engaged
in the first step of collaboration. 12 LEAs finally participated in the actual experiment.
5.2 Contemporary indicators
We first consider socio-economic and health indicators which are most associated with
the proposed experiment. We have these at the local authority level for 2008, which were
the most recent available indicators in June 2010 when the recruitment of the experiment
took place. The next section discusses the role of pre-intervention trends.
We have information on the average weekly household income5, the percentage of free
school meals (school meals are part of a means-tested programme and around 17% of
children receive free school meals in the UK), the number of schools in the area, and
a number of variables capturing overweight children and obesity rates, as well as adult
health habits (and in particular, the percentage of people eating the recommended five
portions of fruit and vegetables per day).
Regarding the initial response first (Table 2 Panel A) – a response can be either
negative (0) or positive (1). Each of our definitions of selection are estimated using a
probit regression, and the estimates in each of the tables are presented as marginal effects.
We find that areas with a larger number of schools were more likely to respond, and we
find some evidence (although the coefficients are not always significant) that authorities
with a higher income and a lower consumption of fruit and vegetables were more likely to
do so. Turning to the probability of a positive interested response (Table 2 panel B) (and
assuming that no response within a month is a negative response), we find that larger
LEAs and LEAs with richer households are more likely to be interested. We find that
those with a lower consumption of fruit and vegetables are also more likely to respond,
as well as those more confronted with a child obesity problem. These results support
the hypothesis that areas with lower levels of fruit and vegetable consumption and higher
obesity rates may care more about the outcome of interest, and may have higher marginal
benefits from the intervention.
We include additional health indicators to gauge whether the selection is driven by the
general state of health in the local area or whether it operates mainly through the indica-
tors and variables that are specifically targeted in the study (children’s obesity and diet).
Of course these general indicators are correlated with the more specific ones, but the ques-
tion is whether these general indicators alone are good predictors of interest. In columns
5Full description of the variables and their sources are presented in Appendix C.
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(5) and (6) we substitute indicators for smoking and binge drinking with the indicator
of fruit and vegetable consumption. We find that these indicators are poor predictors
of collaboration – the coefficients are close to zero and rather precisely estimated. This
suggests that the interest is not reflecting a general poor state of health in the area but
is rather reflecting specific weaknesses with respect to the indicators specifically targeted
in the study.
Examining those who collaborate with us, Table 3 panel A, we find less systematic
differences in terms of observable characteristics than for the initial interest. The number
of schools, and income remain significant. Obesity rates are not systematically different.
We also fail to find systematic differences according to the percentage of free school meal
children. There remains a systematic difference, albeit to a lesser extent, in terms of fruit
and vegetable consumption, which is perhaps the most obvious outcome of interest in our
study. Table 3 Panel B shows little selection along the lines of actual participation.
Tables B1-B4 examine determinants that, although not directly associated, could de-
termine response and interest in the intervention. We include the level of education at
the age groups we would target in the intervention – key stage 1 (taken at aged 6) and
key stage 2 (taken at aged 11). Those with better key stage 2 scores are more likely to
respond, however, this is not the case for expressing a positive interest. Given the political
timing in which we contacted the local authorities, there was a huge amount of uncertainty
surrounding funding. We therefore consider three types of public spending measures: Per
pupil spending for the current year, the change in spending, and the spending at the local
authority level, none of which determine participation at any level. We also control for
the gender of the initial two contacts (the CEO of the local authority and the director
of children’s services), and of the most likely contact to whom our original letter would
have been passed on to, the healthy schools contact. The gender of these contacts does
not determine response, interest or collaboration.
Summarizing the results, we find some evidence of selection taking place, but it is
mild, certainly when it comes to the actual collaboration.
5.3 Pre-trends
We now consider the role of pre-trends in health and education indicators. The question is
whether the areas that responded and engaged in collaboration with us were on different
trends than others. For example, are these areas confronted with a deterioration in these
health indicators or, on the contrary, are they the ones on a positive trend, which could
indicate that they are effectively engaged in improving children’s diet and obesity already?
16
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Table 4 panel A controls for trends in obesity and overweight rates. We find no
evidence of any selection based on those trends. Of course it could be that both types are
more likely to self-select: more than one standard deviation up or one than more standard
deviation down in comparison to 2006 level. Panel B controls for trend in education, again
we find no evidence of self-selection.
5.4 Non monotonicity
As discussed earlier, a priori there could be positive and negative selection taking place
at the same time, that is, both the optimists and the pessimists could choose to opt out.
To the extent that these beliefs are correlated with observables in a monotonic way, then
one way to allow for positive and negative selection at the same time is to allow for non
monotonicity in the relationship between observables and the probability of opting in.
Table 5 replaces the continuous measures of the key variables (fruit and vegetable,
obesity, and income) with dummies representing the mid-point and an upper value for
that variable. These show that those who self-select are those with the greatest problems
to solve. The areas with the highest levels of fruit and vegetable consumption are the
least likely to express an interest or collaborate. The areas with the top third of fruit and
vegetable consumption are between 32 and 29 percentage points more likely to express
and interest, around 25 percentage points to collaborate, however there are no systematic
differences in the propensity to collaborate or participate.
5.5 Selection of Schools
We next turn to the selection of schools that were recruited into the intervention. As
mentioned above we asked each local authority to provide the names of schools that could
take part in the experiment. We then contacted these five schools, briefed them and they
ultimately decided whether they wanted to participate or not. This allows us to study
the selection of schools into the experiment as well as well as examine the variables that
might determine non-participation.
We have detailed information about the schools in each local authority. We have
information on free school meal participation, school size and a range of school spending
variables. In addition, we also have information from school‘ inspections conducted by the
official inspection body Ofsted6. These inspections are summarized in reports that provide
measures of how well the school operates or performs in various dimensions. There is a
general measure of school performance, which assigns scores from 1 to 4, where a score of
6www.ofsted.gov.uk/
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1 is outstanding, 2 is good, 3 is satisfactory, and 4 is inadequate. There is also a measure
that provides information on how well the school performs at “getting its pupils to adopt
healthy lifestyles”, which is obviously directly relevant in this context. Schools are rated
according to a similar scoring rule (from 1 to 4) as the general measure7. This measure
is the closest indicator we have that captures the involvement of schools in promoting
healthy lifestyles.
Table 6 presents the results of the analysis of school selection. To do this, we use the
sample of all schools located in the 12 participating local authorities. In columns 1 to
3 the dependent variable in each case is binary represented by a one if the school was
chosen and decided to participate in the intervention and zero otherwise. In column 1 we
include both infant (for children aged between four and 7) and junior schools.8. We find
a positive selection with regard to the health promotion measure (Ofsted health score 1)
as well as those with a medium level of free school meal participation. However, these are
only significant at the 10% level. The second column additionally controls for the average
maths and english score at key stage 29. As the test “score” comes from exams which
are taken by children aged 11 for key stage 2 column 2 no longer includes those separate
infant schools. Column 3 drops the test score variable and shows the estimates only on the
sample from column 2. We find a negative selection with regards to an overall indicator
of school performance (Ofsted score 1). But the schools that are selected by the local
authority are more likely to be those with an “outstanding” score in promoting healthy
lifestyles. In column 4 and 5 we instead use the final sample of schools that started and
completed the experiment. The pattern is similar for all the selected schools that took
part in the experiment.
Next we examine whether there were any differences between schools that participated
and schools that initially agreed to participate but dropped out before the start of the
7The OFSTED evaluations are not used as an indicator for school headteachers to get a bonus. Nor
are the principals are incentivised based on the health behaviours of their pupils, at least not explicitly.
However, it has been reported in the media that principals have been feeling under threat of losing their
jobs as a result of bad OFSTED reports. See for example: http://www.theguardian.com/education/
2014/mar/11/heads-poor-ofsted-report-dismissal-shortages Schools (and their governing bodies)
have a lot of freedom in determining the principals pay but must follow some rules set by the Department
of Education. It is clear that the OFSTED reports are certainly playing a role in evaluating the perfor-
mance of a school. The evaluation of the principal is part of the OFSTED report (and is separate from
the evaluation of other dimensions such as pupil performance and promotion of healthy behaviours).
8Infant and junior schools are both types of primary school. Infants schools are for children aged
between four and seven and junior schools are for children aged between eight and eleven. Infant are
typically linked to a junior school. Some infants schools do however financially report separately
9The average point score gives a more rounded picture of how well the students performed. Points are
points awarded per subject per pupil along the following lines: working below the level of the test or not
awarded 15, level 2 receives 15 points, level 3 gets 21, level 4 gets 27 and 33 points is allocated for level
5. The average score is then calculated from the following: (Total points for English + Total points for
maths) / (Total number of eligible pupils for each subject)
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experiment. In Table 7 we compare and test the difference in the sample means of the
schools that took part in the experiment and those that dropped out and did not start, or
complete, the experimental intervention. To determine the significance of the differences,
we use the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test. The final column reports the p-value of
this test. We do not find any significant differences between the schools that dropped out
or did not take part and those which took part in the experiment.
6. Treatment Effects and Observables
In this section we examine the treatment effect of the experiment and examine whether this
varies according to the characteristics that have been shown to, albeit mildly, determine
selection into the experiment. In particular we focus on the immediate effect of the
intervention and focus on how the treatment effect differs according to the proportion of
fruit and vegetable consumption for the adult population, the average household income
and the number of schools in the local authority. In addition, at the school level we
examine the ofsted health score.10 We estimate the following:
Cislt = β1Ont + β2Comps ·Ont + β3Inds ·Ont
+ β4Comps ·Ont ·AboveAvgFVl + β5Inds ·Ont ·AboveAvgFVl + β6Ont ·AboveAvgFVl
+ β7Comps ·Ont ·HSs + β8Inds ·Ont ·HSs + β8Inds ·On ·HSs
+ β10Comps ·Ont ·AboveAvgIncl + β11Inds ·Ont ·AboveAvgIncl + β12Ont ·AboveAvgIncl
+ β13Comps ·Ont ·AboveAvgNSchl + β14Inds ·Ont ·AboveAvgNSchl + β15Ont ·AboveAvgNSchl
+ αi + islt
where Cislt indicates whether individual i in school s located in local authority l on
day t chose a fruit or vegetable, we also examine whether the child ate at least some of it
(we call this “try”). On is a dummy that takes a one for weeks 2 to 5 when the incentives
were in place, and 0 for the baseline week (week 1). Comp and Ind denote whether school
s was part of the competition or individual incentive schemes. The treatment effects of
interest are given by the interaction terms of Comp and Ind with on. To capture whether
the treatment effect differs by the variables that are correlated with selection into the
experiment we interact the treatment effects with the additional variables. Specifically,
for fruit and vegetable consumption we create a dummy variable, AboveAvgFVl, that
10We do not examine the overall ofsted score as we do not have enough schools in each treatment to
make this viable.
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takes a one if the pupil was in a school in a local authority was above the average for fruit
and vegetable consumption compared to other local authorities and interact this with the
treatment effect interactions. Furthermore, we include (interacted with the treatment
effect) HSs that takes a one if pupils is in a school that had an ofsted health score that
was outstanding and zero otherwise, AboveAvgIncl taking a one if a pupil lived in a
local authority with above average household income, and AboveAvgNSchl equals one if
a pupil lives in a local authority with above average number of schools. The unobserved
error term is islt and an individual fixed effect is given by αi.
Table 8 presents the estimates from the experiment.11 The first column presents the
estimates for the dependent variable choice12 for the whole sample. Column 2 considers
another group of interest - those who did not choose fruit or vegetable 100% of the
time during the baseline week. This group has some margin to improve. In this case
we find a larger difference in the treatment effects between those above and below fruit
and vegetable consumption. However, when looking at this sub-sample, our analysis
contains less than 30 schools. Therefore, the standard clustering methods might not be
appropriate. To deal with this we correct for the potential clustering problems using
the wild bootstrap method proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008). The p-
values from this procedure are presented in the square brackets. In column 3 we replace
the dependent variable with try, and in the final column we keep try as the dependent
variable but use the same sample as in column 2 i.e. those who did not choose a fruit or
vegetable everyday in the baseline week.
We find that the competition treatment effects are larger for schools with an out-
standing ofsted health score, however, this is only statistically significant for the sample
that includes those who chose less than 100% in the first week. The treatment effects
also significantly differ by average income. Typically the competition treatment effect
is negative for areas with above average income but positive for the individual incentive
scheme. While none of the variables show a consistent positive treatment effect across
both treatments types we do find the joint test of the triple interaction terms to be sig-
nificant. Therefore, we find some evidence that the treatment effects are significantly
different along the lines of the variables that determine selection however it is not always
in the same direction.
11A full account of the treatment effects of the experiment is documented in Belot, James and Nolen
(2015).
12The variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the child chose a portion of fruit and vegetables at lunch or
brought a fruit or vegetable in their packed lunch.
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7. Conclusion
This paper discusses and provides evidence of selection of field experimental partners in
a policy relevant experiment. We provide evidence based on a specific policy experiment,
which consists of providing incentives to children to eat fruit and vegetables at lunch. All
potential partners were approached at the same time. We have access to a range of rele-
vant observable measures likely to be correlated with prior beliefs about the effectiveness
of the intervention and with the ability to conduct the intervention. We observe mild
selection along observable characteristics. Local authorities interested in collaborating
tend to be larger and richer, and have lower levels of fruit and vegetable consumption.
Next to that, the schools suggested by local authorities and ultimately participate in the
experiment tend to be those who are already outstanding in promoting healthy lifestyles.
Local authorities are more likely to involve schools that are already engaged in promot-
ing healthy lifestyles, but who do not score highly on an overall evaluation measure of
management. We also do not see a systematic difference between those who were selected
by the local authority but do not complete the experiment intervention. Finally, we ex-
amined how the treatment effect from the field experiment differs according the variables
that were shown to albeit mildly determine selection. We find some evidence of significant
differences in the treatment effect although these results are mixed and inconsistent.
Overall we find that the schools that are part of the experimental sample do not show
strong systematic differences along observable socio-economic characteristics, but they are
those who have possibly experimented before and are more likely to be located in areas
where there is a problem to solve.
While this study is merely a show case of the type of selection that could take place in
field experimental research, we believe it brings a general positive message: Researchers
could in principle afford to draw broader conclusions from their studies if more effort was
spent on documenting the nature of selection into the experiment. Presenting summary
statistics like those reported in Table 1 should be relatively straightforward in most field
experimental studies. If a sufficient number of partners has been selected, it may even be
possible to study how the treatment effects vary with observables, in the spirit of Table
8. Although both exercises are imperfect as they rely on observables only, they would in
opinion largely improve the current situation, where researchers are forced to be extremely
conservative in drawing conclusions and extrapolate to the general population.
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Figure 1: Decision tree of the local authorities
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All Responded Did not Participate Did not
Respond Participate
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. p-value mean s.d. mean s.d. p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Contacted on Friday 0.49 0.50 0.59 0.50 0.41 0.50 0.04 0.75 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.06
Contacted by J James 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.34 0.58 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.60
Household Income/100 6.72 1.45 6.72 1.42 6.73 1.48 0.95 6.10 0.81 6.78 1.48 0.12
% FSM 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.26 0.15 0.07 0.18 0.09 0.33
Number of Schools/100 1.45 1.23 1.64 1.42 1.30 1.06 0.10 2.27 2.06 1.37 1.11 0.02
% Eat 5 Fruit & Veg a day 25.9 4.9 25.4 4.8 26.2 5.0 0.34 24.5 4.4 26.0 4.9 0.31
% Overweight & Obese reception 23.0 2.7 23.2 2.8 22.9 2.6 0.47 23.6 3.1 23.0 2.6 0.44
% Obese reception 9.84 1.76 10.13 1.90 9.62 1.62 0.08 9.94 1.67 9.83 1.77 0.83
% Overweight & Obese yr 6 33.2 3.3 33.6 3.5 32.9 3.1 0.18 33.1 3.3 33.2 3.3 0.93
% Obese yr 6 18.8 2.9 19.2 3.2 18.5 2.7 0.16 18.5 2.5 18.9 3.0 0.65
% Smoking 24.7 4.6 25.0 4.6 24.5 4.6 0.58 25.6 5.1 24.6 4.5 0.49
% Binge Drinking 18.2 4.6 18.1 4.4 18.3 4.7 0.82 20.2 3.6 18.0 4.6 0.12
Key stage 1: Avg point score 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.54 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.61
Key stage 2: Avg point score 0.28 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.76 0.28 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.91
Per pupil spending 2010/11 4509 583 4582 674 4452 498 0.19 4307 220 4527 602 0.21
% change in per pupil spending 2010/11 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.62 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.51
% LA spending change 2010/11 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.56 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.03 1.00
Female CEO of the council 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.44 0.25 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.94
Female Director of Children Services 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.34 0.67 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.26
Female Leader of Healthy Schools 0.82 0.38 0.83 0.38 0.82 0.39 0.90 0.75 0.45 0.83 0.38 0.51
% of Labour Councillors 0.33 0.26 0.34 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.65 0.32 0.25 0.33 0.26 0.83
% of Conservative Councillors 0.42 0.26 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.76 0.43 0.25 0.42 0.26 0.87
Labour controlled council 0.29 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.78 0.25 0.45 0.29 0.46 0.75
Conservative controlled council 0.42 0.50 0.41 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.87 0.42 0.51 0.42 0.50 0.98
Ofsted Score 2.29 0.20 2.30 0.19 2.28 0.21 0.47 2.34 0.25 2.28 0.19 0.34
Ofsted Health Score 1.70 0.16 1.71 0.16 1.69 0.16 0.49 1.68 0.16 1.70 0.16 0.71
Catering pp/100 0.82 0.59 0.85 0.63 0.80 0.57 0.68 0.80 0.63 0.82 0.59 0.88
Energy costs pp/100 0.66 0.12 0.67 0.12 0.65 0.12 0.43 0.69 0.11 0.66 0.12 0.31
Total school Income pp/1000 4.34 0.50 4.43 0.53 4.28 0.47 0.07 4.29 0.26 4.35 0.52 0.73
Teaching costs pp/1000 2.14 0.18 2.17 0.18 2.11 0.18 0.07 2.10 0.11 2.14 0.18 0.51
Notes: p-values in column 7 refer to a two-sided t-test between local authorities that responded against those that did not respond, and column 12 shows the p-value that tests the difference between those local
authorities that had schools which participated in the experiment versus those that did not. Local authorities were randomly contacted on two days on Friday 2nd July and Monday 5th July and by J. James or
M. Belot. Income is the average weekly total household income (£) divided by 100, FSM is the percentage of children who are eligible for free school meals. % Eat 5 Fruit & Veg a day is the proportion of adults
defined to be consumers of 5 or more fruit and vegetables if they had reported that they had consumed 5 or more portions of fruit and vegetables on the previous day. Binge drinking is the proportion of adult
binge drinkers defined if they reported that in the last week they had drunk 8 or more units of alcohol if they were a man, or 6 or more units of alcohol if they were a woman, on any one day or more. Smoking
is the proportion of individuals in a local authority who reported that they were a ‘current cigarette smoker’ in the Health Survey for England. Overweight and Obese reception is the percentage of pupils in the
local authority who were overweight or obese when they entered primary school aged 4 or 5. Year 6 is the final year of school when the pupils are aged 10 or 11. The average point score (APS) of the key stage 1
test and key stage 2 point score are for tests taken in primary school. The points are awarded per subject per pupil along the following lines: working below the level of the test or not awarded 15, level 2 receives
15 points, level 3 gets 21, level 4 gets 27 and 33 points is allocated for level 5. The APS is then calculated using the following: (Total points for English + Total points for maths + Total points for science) /
(Total number of eligible pupils for each subject). This is then rescaled by dividing by 100. Per pupil spending in 2010/11, the yearly increase in per pupil spending, and the overall change in the spending of the
local authority. Labour Party and Conservative Party councillors on the council defined at the most recent election since July 2010. Ofsted is (the government school inspector) average score of the schools in the
local authority. Schools are inspected and judged on the following question: “How effective, efficient and inclusive is the provision of education, integrated care and any extended services in meeting the needs of
learners?” With ratings given of: 1. Outstanding 2. Good 3. Satisfactory 4. Inadequate. Ofsted Health Score is based on the following question: “Learners are encouraged and enabled to eat and drink healthily”
using the same 1 to 4 scale. Average catering costs (including staff costs), energy, teaching and total school income are per pupil averages at the local authority level and are rescaled as indicated.
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Table 2 Main Determinants of response to initial e-mail, interest and response
Panel A: Response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.142 0.147* 0.141 0.140 0.124 0.123
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087)
Contacted by J James 0.076 0.073 0.075 0.072 0.085 0.085
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084)
Income/100 0.084* 0.082 0.084* 0.085* 0.016 0.007
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.038) (0.038)
% FSM 0.741 0.129 0.660 0.344 0.759 0.843
(0.570) (0.727) (0.782) (0.808) (0.591) (0.525)
Number of schools/100 0.080** 0.080** 0.080** 0.081** 0.071* 0.070*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
% Eat 5 Fruit & Veg a day -0.028* -0.026* -0.028* -0.027*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
% Overweight & Obese Reception -0.000
(0.019)
% Obese Reception 0.044
(0.036)
% Overweight & Obese Year 6 0.003
(0.021)
% Obese Year 6 0.016
(0.025)
% Smokers 0.004
(0.014)
% Binge Drinkers -0.001
(0.012)
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
R squared 0.0656 0.0731 0.0657 0.0676 0.0482 0.0479
Panel B: Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.066 0.070 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.052
(0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.082)
Contacted by J James 0.041 0.030 0.034 0.027 0.056 0.053
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078)
Income/100 0.140*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.143*** 0.057* 0.035
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.034) (0.034)
% FSM 0.568 -0.057 -0.122 -0.380 0.566 0.813*
(0.479) (0.610) (0.655) (0.717) (0.497) (0.458)
Number of schools/100 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.074** 0.069**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
% Eat 5 Fruit & Veg a day -0.036** -0.035** -0.033** -0.035**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
% Overweight & Obese Reception 0.017
(0.018)
% Obese Reception 0.061*
(0.033)
% Overweight & Obese Year 6 0.035*
(0.020)
% Obese Year 6 0.051**
(0.026)
% Smokers 0.015
(0.012)
% Binge Drinkers 0.003
(0.011)
Observations 128 128 128 128 128 128
R squared 0.113 0.131 0.128 0.133 0.0657 0.0565
Notes: Panel A presents the determinants of any response to the initial email that was sent to local authorities.
Panel B shows the results for the local authority expressing an interest in the project. The coefficients are
the marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Local authorities were randomly contacted on two days on Friday 2nd July and Monday 5th July and by J.
James or M. Belot. Income is the average weekly total household income (£) divided by 100, FSM is the
percentage of children who are eligible for free school meals. % Eat 5 Fruit & Veg a day is the proportion of
adults defined to be consumers of 5 or more fruit and vegetables if they had reported that they had consumed
5 or more portions of fruit and vegetables on the previous day. Binge drinkers is the proportion of adult
binge drinkers defined if they reported that in the last week they had drunk 8 or more units of alcohol if they
were a man, or 6 or more units of alcohol if they were a woman, on any one day or more. Smokers is the
proportion of individuals in a local authority who reported that they were a ‘current cigarette smoker’ in the
Health Survey for England. Overweight and Obese represent reception is the percentage of pupils in the local
authority who were overweight or obese when they entered primary school aged 4 or 5. Year 6 is the final
year of school when the pupils are aged 10 or 11.
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Table 3 Main Determinants of response to initial e-mail, collaboration and participation
Panel A: Collaboration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.004 0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 0.000
(0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068)
Contacted by J James 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.022 0.021
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065)
Income/100 0.086** 0.083** 0.081** 0.086** 0.030 0.030
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.029) (0.029)
% FSM 0.425 0.055 0.092 -0.141 0.437 0.580
(0.408) (0.517) (0.563) (0.595) (0.425) (0.382)
Number of schools/100 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.063** 0.062**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
% Eat 5 Fruit & Veg a day -0.024* -0.024* -0.022* -0.023*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
% Overweight & Obese Reception 0.009
(0.015)
% Obese Reception 0.035
(0.026)
% Overweight & Obese Year 6 0.017
(0.016)
% Obese Year 6 0.028
(0.019)
% Smokers 0.008
(0.010)
% Binge Drinkers 0.007
(0.009)
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
R squared 0.0748 0.0840 0.0792 0.0864 0.0460 0.0458
Panel B: Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contacted on Friday 0.062 0.064* 0.058 0.061 0.060 0.064
(0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042)
Contacted by J James 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.012
(0.032) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Income/100 -0.029 -0.030 -0.033 -0.031 -0.029 -0.019
(0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021)
% FSM -0.402 -0.583** -0.520 -0.435 -0.448 -0.396
(0.282) (0.288) (0.354) (0.386) (0.322) (0.279)
Number of schools/100 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
% Eat 5 Fruit & Veg a day -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
% Overweight & Obese Reception 0.009
(0.008)
% Obese Reception 0.024*
(0.013)
% Overweight & Obese Year 6 0.007
(0.009)
% Obese Year 6 0.003
(0.011)
% Smokers 0.004
(0.005)
% Binge Drinkers 0.007
(0.006)
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
R squared 0.159 0.185 0.150 0.144 0.148 0.160
Notes: Panel A examines whether the local authority collaborated by providing the names of schools. Panel
B examines whether a local authority had a school take part in the experiment. The coefficients are the
marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Local authorities were randomly contacted on two days on Friday 2nd July and Monday 5th July and by J.
James or M. Belot. Income is the average weekly total household income, FSM is the percentage of children
who are eligible for free school meals. Fruit & Veg is the proportion of adults defined to be consumers of 5
or more fruit and vegetables if they had reported that they had consumed 5 or more portions of fruit and
vegetables on the previous day. Binge drinking is the proportion of adult binge drinkers defined if they reported
that in the last week they had drunk 8 or more units of alcohol if they were a man, or 6 or more units of alcohol
if they were a woman, on any one day or more. Smoking is the proportion of individuals in a local authority
who reported that they were a ‘current cigarette smoker’ in the Health Survey for England. Overweight and
Obese represent reception is the percentage of pupils in the local authority who were overweight or obese
when they entered primary school aged 4 or 5. Year 6 is the final year of school when the pupils are aged 10
or 11.
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Table 4 Role of Pre-Trends in Obesity and Education
Panel A: Obesity Trends
Response Interest Collaboration Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contacted by J James 0.090 0.091 0.059 0.060 0.020 0.021 0.014 0.015
(0.084) (0.084) (0.076) (0.076) (0.064) (0.064) (0.035) (0.035)
Income/100 0.076 0.073 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.081** 0.079** -0.034 -0.032
(0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.048) (0.039) (0.040) (0.024) (0.024)
% FSM 0.823 0.636 0.739 0.561 0.514 0.370 -0.269 -0.180
(0.588) (0.737) (0.511) (0.644) (0.440) (0.538) (0.333) (0.381)
Number of schools/100 0.093** 0.094** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.022 0.022
(0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.014) (0.014)
% Eat 5 Fruit and Veg a day -0.025 -0.025 -0.037** -0.037** -0.024** -0.025** -0.002 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Obesity 2008-Obesity 2006 (Reception) -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.000
(0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.009)
Obesity 2008-Obesity 2006 (y6) -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 0.003
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.008)
Observations 146 146 129 129 146 146 146 146
R squared 0.0508 0.0517 0.0991 0.100 0.0702 0.0711 0.111 0.113
Panel B: Education Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contacted by J James 0.092 0.089 0.034 0.030 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.016
(0.085) (0.084) (0.077) (0.077) (0.063) (0.063) (0.032) (0.032)
Income/100 0.078 0.074 0.137*** 0.139*** 0.081** 0.085** -0.032 -0.034
(0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.040) (0.039) (0.022) (0.022)
% FSM 0.454 0.313 -0.405 -0.252 -0.250 -0.108 -0.256 -0.309
(0.843) (0.855) (0.733) (0.755) (0.613) (0.612) (0.367) (0.384)
Number of schools/100 0.094** 0.092** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.026* 0.024*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026) (0.014) (0.013)
% Obese Reception 0.040 0.040 0.030 0.032 0.020 0.019 0.025 0.026
(0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.017)
% Obese Year 6 -0.001 -0.000 0.037 0.036 0.019 0.021 -0.006 -0.007
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012)
KS1 Score 2009-KS1 Score 2007 -0.155 -0.052 0.055 -0.085
(0.226) (0.199) (0.165) (0.090)
% Eat 5 Fruit and Veg a day -0.022 -0.022 -0.032** -0.033** -0.022* -0.022* -0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
KS2 Score 2009-KS2 Score 2007 3.125 -20.65 -15.45 -3.82
(24.33) (22.77) (18.40) (10.11)
Observations 146 146 129 129 146 146 146 146
R squared 0.0592 0.0569 0.131 0.136 0.0870 0.0912 0.155 0.145
Notes: Panel A examines whether the change in obesity rates determine whether a local authority responds (columns 1 and 2),
expresses interest (columns 3 and 4), collaborates (columns 5 and 6), or participates (columns 7 and 8). In the odd columns we focus
on those just entering primary school, and in even columns we examine those in the final year of primary school. Panel B examines
changes in education performance. In the odd columns we focus on key stage 1 exams (taken aged 6), and in even columns we examine
key stage 2 (taken aged 10). The coefficients are the marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5 Splines of key variables
Response Interest Collaboration Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contacted on Friday 0.125 0.120 0.039 0.044 -0.009 -0.008 0.017 0.011
(0.087) (0.088) (0.080) (0.080) (0.065) (0.065) (0.020) (0.015)
Contacted by J James 0.099 0.116 0.069 0.074 0.023 0.034 -0.001 0.003
(0.085) (0.086) (0.077) (0.078) (0.063) (0.063) (0.010) (0.007)
% FSM 1.137 0.210 0.476 0.009 0.305 -0.021 -0.076 -0.120
(0.728) (0.651) (0.633) (0.554) (0.513) (0.447) (0.108) (0.129)
Number of schools/100 0.072* 0.084** 0.083** 0.086** 0.066** 0.071** 0.000 0.001
(0.040) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.004) (0.003)
Income/100 -0.003 0.018 0.082 0.077 0.053 0.055 -0.049 -0.035
(0.064) (0.065) (0.056) (0.057) (0.047) (0.047) (0.037) (0.033)
Income Mid 0.180 0.133 0.162 0.104 0.107 0.067 0.049 0.030
(0.128) (0.131) (0.129) (0.130) (0.108) (0.106) (0.049) (0.036)
Income Upper 0.228 0.106 0.205 0.110 0.170 0.095 0.616** 0.508
(0.216) (0.227) (0.215) (0.216) (0.189) (0.182) (0.283) (0.316)
Fruit & Veg Mid -0.118 -0.084 -0.099 -0.069 -0.086 -0.070 0.018 0.023
(0.120) (0.122) (0.100) (0.106) (0.079) (0.081) (0.026) (0.029)
Fruit & Veg Upper -0.210 -0.174 -0.323*** -0.287** -0.266*** -0.246*** -0.003 0.001
(0.148) (0.149) (0.110) (0.116) (0.092) (0.094) (0.019) (0.015)
Obesity Mid (y6) -0.010 0.233* 0.107 -0.007
(0.117) (0.125) (0.102) (0.011)
Obesity Upper (y6) -0.084 0.158 0.093 -0.016
(0.152) (0.168) (0.135) (0.021)
Obese Mid (Reception) 0.023 0.026 0.005 -0.008
(0.116) (0.112) (0.088) (0.011)
Obese Upper (Reception) 0.236* 0.286* 0.204 0.009
(0.142) (0.157) (0.135) (0.018)
Observations 147 147 130 130 147 147 147 147
R squared 0.0678 0.0831 0.144 0.152 0.109 0.129 0.289 0.318
Notes: All coefficients presented as marginal effects from a probit regression, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Mid
refers to above the 33rd and below (and equal to) the 66th centiles, upper refers to above the 66th percentile, the r eference group is below (or
equal to) the 33rd pecentile. Overweight and Obese reception is the percentage of pupils in the local authority who were overweight or obese when
they entered primary school aged 4 or 5. Year 6 is the final year of school when the pupils are aged 10 or 11.
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Table 6 Selected Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Selected schools Experiment sample
Ofsted Health Score 1 0.0147* 0.0169** 0.0169** 0.0107 0.0118*
(0.00781) (0.00837) (0.00835) (0.00655) (0.00667)
Ofsted Health Score 3 or 4 0.0262 0.0268 0.0268 0.0182 0.0193
(0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0145) (0.0141)
Ofsted Score 1 -0.0109 -0.0297** -0.0298*** -0.00386 -0.0230**
(0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0114) (0.00849) (0.00926)
Ofsted Score 3 or 4 -0.00744 -0.00770 -0.00769 -0.00110 0.000690
(0.00763) (0.00818) (0.00799) (0.00640) (0.00652)
FSM Medium 0.0277** 0.0252* 0.0252* 0.0212* 0.0167
(0.0139) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0116) (0.0116)
FSM Low 0.00657 0.00514 0.00512 0.00545 0.00132
(0.0134) (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0112) (0.0119)
Energy Costs per pupil/100 0.0156 0.0151 0.0151 0.000138 -0.00479
(0.0114) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.00959) (0.0102)
Total School Income per pupil/1000 -0.00305 -0.00649 -0.00648 0.00135 -0.000778
(0.00719) (0.00846) (0.00821) (0.00603) (0.00674)
Catering (inc staff) costs per pupil/100 -0.00379 -0.00560 -0.00560 6.93e-05 -0.000444
(0.00506) (0.00595) (0.00595) (0.00424) (0.00474)
Total pupils/100 0.00111 0.00243 0.00244 -0.00263 -0.00104
(0.00364) (0.00397) (0.00390) (0.00305) (0.00316)
Teaching Costs per pupil/1000 -0.00500 0.00859 0.00858 -0.0163 -0.00894
(0.0135) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0113) (0.0124)
Avg Eng/Math Score 09/10 -0.00144 0.0783
(0.277) (0.221)
Constant 0.0577 0.0490 0.0486 0.0815*** 0.0609
(0.0363) (0.0937) (0.0428) (0.0304) (0.0747)
Observations 2,087 1,778 1,778 2,087 1,778
R-squared 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.031 0.032
Mean of dep. var 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.013
Notes: The sample is all schools in the participating local authorities. Ofsted is (the government school inspector) average score of
the schools in the local authority. Schools are inspected and judged on the following question: “How effective, efficient and inclusive
is the provision of education, integrated care and any extended services in meeting the needs of learners?” With ratings given of:
1. Outstanding 2. Good 3. Satisfactory 4. Inadequate. Ofsted Health Score is based on the following question: “Learners are
encouraged and enabled to eat and drink healthily” using the same 1 to 4 scale. Average catering costs (including staff costs), energy,
teaching and total school income are per pupil averages at the local authority level and are rescaled as indicated. FSM Band - The
three broad bands used to group pupils eligible for FSM are: Low: less than 20%, Medium: 20.01-35% and High: greater than 35%
(omitted catergory). Columns (1)-(3) present estimates using whether a school was selected by the LEA. Column (3) excludes “Avg
Eng/Math Score” but uses the same sample in column (2). Column (4) and (5) use whether a school started and completed the
experimental intervention. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7 Comparison of participating schools from the pool of selected schools
Experiment Dropped p-value of difference
% Girls 0.48 0.49 0.802
Number of pupils 207 279 0.322
Total School Income per pupil/1000 4.17 4.16 0.641
Catering costs per pupil/100 0.96 0.73 0.303
% English and Maths above level 4 KS2 0.76 0.76 0.949
Average point score Maths and English 0.28 0.28 0.396
Ofsted Score 2.09 2.29 0.521
Ofsted health Score 1.53 1.43 0.604
FSM Medium 0.29 0.29 0.975
FSM Low 0.65 0.64 0.988
Teaching Costs per pupil/1000 2.05 2.17 0.246
Energy costs per pupil/100 0.64 0.87 0.961
Competition treatment 0.29 0.43 0.368
Individual treatment 0.32 0.36 0.822
Control 0.39 0.21 0.260
Schools 31 15
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show the mean values at the school level. Column 3 is the p-value of (Prob>z, where z is the test
statistic) from an Mann-Whitney U test. Ofsted is (the government school inspector) average score of the schools in the
local authority. Schools are inspected and judged on the following question: “How effective, efficient and inclusive is the
provision of education, integrated care and any extended services in meeting the needs of learners?” With ratings given of: 1.
Outstanding 2. Good 3. Satisfactory 4. Inadequate. Ofsted Health Score is based on the following question: “Learners are
encouraged and enabled to eat and drink healthily” using the same 1 to 4 scale. Average catering costs (including staff costs),
energy, teaching and total school income are per pupil averages at the local authority level and are rescaled as indicated.
FSM Band - The three broad bands used to group pupils eligible for FSM are: Low: less than 20%, Medium: 20.01-35% and
High: greater than 35% (omitted catergory). Columns (1)-(3) present estimates using whether a school was selected by the
LEA. Column (3) excludes “Avg Eng/Math Score” but uses the same sample in column (2). Column (4) and (5) use whether
a school started and completed the experimental intervention.
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Table 8 Treatment Effects and Selection Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Choice Try
All <100% All <100%
Comp x On -0.074 -0.175*** -0.009 0.108*
(0.048) (0.036) (0.058) (0.056)
[0.282] [0.250] [0.909] [0.519]
Ind x On -0.122 -0.214*** -0.087 -0.145**
(0.106) (0.067) (0.109) (0.053)
[0.513] [0.553] [0.611] [0.541]
Comp x On x Above Avg FV 0.084* 0.297*** 0.262*** 0.275***
(0.042) (0.024) (0.041) (0.029)
[0.178] [0.160] [0.162] [0.438]
Ind x On x Above Avg FV 0.092 0.075 0.138 0.109
(0.116) (0.146) (0.100) (0.090)
[0.613] [0.777] [0.470] [0.703]
On x Above Avg FV -0.003 -0.024 -0.012 -0.038
(0.024) (0.023) (0.035) (0.024)
[0.837] [0.543] [0.841] [0.717]
Comp x On x (Health Score=1) 0.087* 0.221*** 0.193*** 0.194***
(0.045) (0.036) (0.060) (0.059)
[0.238] [0.00] [0.27] 0.082
Ind x On x (Health Score=1) 0.029 -0.049 -0.033 -0.124**
(0.104) (0.067) (0.109) (0.053)
[0.789] [0.759] [0.831] [0.394]
On x (Health Score=1) -0.105*** -0.097** -0.048 0.011
(0.025) (0.035) (0.050) (0.038)
[0.126] [0.036] [0.752] [0.851]
Comp x On x Above Avg Income -0.059 -0.229*** -0.306*** -0.366***
(0.046) (0.034) (0.063) (0.051)
[0.294] [0.000] [0.000] [0.020]
Ind x On x Above Avg Income 0.229*** 0.352* 0.135 0.339***
(0.066) (0.170) (0.093) (0.103)
[0.082] [0.661] [0.320] [0.100]
On x Above Avg Income -0.017 -0.036 0.058 0.011
(0.031) (0.032) (0.052) (0.034)
[0.721] [0.474] [0.452] [0.843]
Comp x On x Above Avg Number of Schools 0.081 0.278*** 0.103* 0.075
(0.052) (0.023) (0.058) (0.052)
[0.300] [0.014] [0.252] [0.324]
Ind x On x Above Avg Number of Schools -0.032 0.027 -0.012 -0.057
(0.119) (0.212) (0.109) (0.128)
[0.877] [0.947] [0.897] [0.791]
On x Above Avg Number of Schools 0.004 -0.080*** -0.001 -0.020
(0.032) (0.021) (0.049) (0.032)
[0.921] [0.074] [1.000] [0.621]
On 0.110*** 0.297*** 0.044 0.189***
(0.025) (0.035) (0.050) (0.038)
Constant 0.806*** 0.496*** 0.712*** 0.414***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 11,759 4,464 11,218 4,364
R-squared 0.018 0.065 0.027 0.081
P-value of joint test of all triple interaction terms 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table presents the treatment effects from the field experiment briefly described in section 4.2 and more fully in Belot, James
and Nolen (2013). Columns (1) and (2) use the dependent variable that indicates whether a fruit or vegetable was chosen, column (3)
and (4) use the variable try. Columns (1) and (3) present estimates for all pupils, columns (2) and (4) restrict the sample to those who
did not choose a fruit or vegetable each day in the baseline week before the incentives were in place. Robust standard errors clustered at
school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown in brackets and are estimated
following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Above Avg indicates where the fruit and vegetable consumption at the
local authority level is equal to or above 26%. Health Score (= 1) indicates the ofsted score for adopting a healthy lifestyle was outstanding.
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